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Midbrain dopamine neurons are well known for their strong responses to rewards and their critical role
in positive motivation. It has become increasingly clear, however, that dopamine neurons also transmit
signals related to salient but nonrewarding experiences such as aversive and alerting events. Here we review
recent advances in understanding the reward and nonreward functions of dopamine. Based on this data, we
propose that dopamine neurons come in multiple types that are connected with distinct brain networks and
have distinct roles in motivational control. Some dopamine neurons encode motivational value, supporting
brain networks for seeking, evaluation, and value learning. Others encode motivational salience, supporting
brain networks for orienting, cognition, and general motivation. Both types of dopamine neurons are
augmented by an alerting signal involved in rapid detection of potentially important sensory cues. We
hypothesize that these dopaminergic pathways for value, salience, and alerting cooperate to support
adaptive behavior.Introduction
The neurotransmitter dopamine (DA) has a crucial role in motiva-
tional control—in learning what things in the world are good and
bad, and in choosing actions to gain the good things and avoid
the bad things. The major sources of DA in the cerebral cortex
and in most subcortical areas are the DA-releasing neurons of
the ventral midbrain, located in the substantia nigra pars com-
pacta (SNc) and ventral tegmental area (VTA) (Bjorklund and
Dunnett, 2007). These neurons transmit DA in two modes,
‘‘tonic’’ and ‘‘phasic’’ (Grace, 1991; Grace et al., 2007). In their
tonic mode, DA neurons maintain a steady, baseline level of
DA in downstream neural structures that is vital for enabling
the normal functions of neural circuits (Schultz, 2007). In their
phasic mode, DA neurons sharply increase or decrease their
firing rates for 100–500ms, causing large changes in DA concen-
trations in downstream structures lasting for several seconds
(Schultz, 1998, 2007).
These phasic DA responses are triggered by many types of
rewards and reward-related sensory cues (Schultz, 1998) and
are ideally positioned to fulfill DA’s roles in motivational control,
including its roles as a teaching signal that underlies reinforce-
ment learning (Schultz et al., 1997; Wise, 2005) and as an
incentive signal that promotes immediate reward seeking (Ber-
ridge and Robinson, 1998). As a result, these phasic DA reward
signals have taken on a prominent role in theories about the func-
tions of cortical and subcortical circuits and have become the
subject of intense neuroscience research. In the first part of
this review we will introduce the conventional theory of phasic
DA reward signals and will review recent advances in under-
standing their nature and their control over neural processing
and behavior.
In contrast to the accepted role of DA in reward processing,
there has been considerable debate over the role of phasic DA
activity in processing nonrewarding events. Some theoriessuggest that DA neuron phasic responses primarily encode
reward-related events (Schultz, 1998, 2007; Ungless, 2004),
while others suggest that DA neurons transmit additional nonre-
ward signals related to surprising, novel, salient, and even
aversive experiences (Redgrave et al., 1999; Horvitz, 2000;
Di Chiara, 2002; Joseph et al., 2003; Pezze and Feldon, 2004;
Lisman and Grace, 2005; Redgrave and Gurney, 2006). In the
second part of this review we will discuss a series of studies
that have put these theories to the test and have revealed
much about the nature of nonreward signals in DA neurons. In
particular, these studies provide evidence that DA neurons are
more diverse than previously thought. Rather than encoding
a single homogeneous motivational signal, DA neurons come
in multiple types that encode reward and nonreward events in
different manners. This poses a problem for general theories
that seek to identify dopamine with a single neural signal or
motivational mechanism.
To remedy this dilemma, in the final part of this review we
propose a new hypothesis to explain the presence of multiple
types of DA neurons, the nature of their neural signals, and their
integration into distinct brain networks for motivational control.
Our basic proposal is as follows. One type of DA neuron encodes
motivational value, excited by rewarding events and inhibited
by aversive events. These neurons support brain systems
for seeking goals, evaluating outcomes, and value learning.
A second type of DA neuron encodes motivational salience,
excited by both rewarding and aversive events. These neurons
support brain systems for orienting, cognitive processing, and
motivational drive. In addition to their value- and salience-coding
activity, both types of DA neurons also transmit an alerting signal,
triggered by unexpected sensory cues of high potential impor-
tance. Together, we hypothesize that these value, salience,
and alerting signals cooperate to coordinate downstream brain
structures and control motivated behavior.Neuron 68, December 9, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 815
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Dopamine in Motivation of Reward-Seeking Actions
Dopamine has long been known to be important for reinforce-
ment and motivation of actions. Drugs that interfere with DA
transmission interfere with reinforcement learning, while manip-
ulations that enhance DA transmission, such as brain stimulation
and addictive drugs, often act as reinforcers (Wise, 2004). DA
transmission is crucial for creating a state of motivation to seek
rewards (Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Salamone et al., 2007)
and for establishing memories of cue-reward associations (Dal-
ley et al., 2005). DA release is not necessary for all forms of
reward learning and may not always be ‘‘liked’’ in the sense of
causing pleasure, but it is critical for causing goals to become
‘‘wanted’’ in the sense of motivating actions to achieve them
(Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Palmiter, 2008).
One hypothesis about how dopamine supports reinforcement
learning is that it adjusts the strength of synaptic connections
between neurons. The most straightforward version of this
hypothesis is that dopamine controls synaptic plasticity accord-
ing to a modified Hebbian rule that can be roughly stated as
‘‘neurons that fire together wire together, as long as they get
a burst of dopamine.’’ In other words, if cell A activates cell B,
and cell B causes a behavioral action that results in a reward,
then dopamine would be released and the A/B connection
would be reinforced (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz, 1998).
This mechanism would allow an organism to learn the optimal
choice of actions to gain rewards, given sufficient trial-and-error
experience. Consistent with this hypothesis, dopamine has
a potent influence on synaptic plasticity in numerous brain
regions (Surmeier et al., 2010; Goto et al., 2010; Molina-Luna
et al., 2009; Marowsky et al., 2005; Lisman and Grace, 2005).
In some cases dopamine enables synaptic plasticity along the
lines of the Hebbian rule described above, in a manner that is
correlated with reward-seeking behavior (Reynolds et al.,
2001). In addition to its effects on long-term synaptic plasticity,
dopamine can also exert immediate control over neural circuits
by modulating neural spiking activity and synaptic connections
between neurons (Surmeier et al., 2007; Robbins and Arnsten,
2009), in some cases doing so in a manner that would promote
immediate reward-seeking actions (Frank, 2005).
Dopamine Neuron Reward Signals
In order to motivate actions that lead to rewards, dopamine
should be released during rewarding experiences. Indeed,
most DA neurons are strongly activated by unexpected primary
rewards such as food and water, often producing phasic
‘‘bursts’’ of activity (Schultz, 1998) (phasic excitations including
multiple spikes; Grace and Bunney, 1983). However, the pio-
neering studies ofWolframSchultz showed that these DA neuron
responses are not triggered by reward consumption per se.
Instead they resemble a ‘‘reward prediction error,’’ reporting
the difference between the reward that is received and the
reward that is predicted to occur (Schultz et al., 1997) (Figure 1A).
Thus, if a reward is larger than predicted, DA neurons are
strongly excited (positive prediction error, Figure 1E, red); if
a reward is smaller than predicted or fails to occur at its ap-
pointed time, DA neurons are phasically inhibited (negative
prediction error, Figure 1E, blue); and if a reward is cued in
advance so that its size is fully predictable, DA neurons have little816 Neuron 68, December 9, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.or no response (zero prediction error, Figure 1C, black). The
same principle holds for DA responses to sensory cues that
provide new information about future rewards. DA neurons are
excited when a cue indicates an increase in future reward value
(Figure 1C, red), inhibited when a cue indicates a decrease in
future reward value (Figure 1C, blue), and generally have little
response to cues that convey no new reward information
(Figure 1E, black). These DA responses resemble a specific
type of reward prediction error called the temporal difference
error or ‘‘TD error,’’ which has been proposed to act as a rein-
forcement signal for learning the value of actions and environ-
mental states (Houk et al., 1995; Montague et al., 1996; Schultz
et al., 1997). Computational models using a TD-like reinforce-
ment signal can explain many aspects of reinforcement learning
in humans, animals, and DA neurons themselves (Sutton and
Barto, 1981; Waelti et al., 2001; Montague and Berns, 2002;
Dayan and Niv, 2008).
An impressive array of experiments have shown that DA
signals represent reward predictions in a manner that closely
matches behavioral preferences, including the preference for
large rewards over small ones (Tobler et al., 2005), probable
rewards over improbable ones (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Satoh
et al., 2003; Morris et al., 2004), and immediate rewards over
delayed ones (Roesch et al., 2007; Fiorillo et al., 2008; Kobayashi
and Schultz, 2008). There is even evidence that DA neurons in
humans encode the reward value of money (Zaghloul et al.,
2009). Furthermore, DA signals emerge during learning with
a similar time course to behavioral measures of reward predic-
tion (Hollerman and Schultz, 1998; Satoh et al., 2003; Takikawa
et al., 2004; Day et al., 2007) and are correlated with subjective
measures of reward preference (Morris et al., 2006). These find-
ings have established DA neurons as one of the best understood
and most replicated examples of reward coding in the brain. As
a result, recent studies have subjected DA neurons to intense
scrutiny to discover how they generate reward predictions and
how their signals act on downstream structures to control
behavior.
Dopamine in Reward: Recent Advances
Dopamine Neuron Reward Signals
Recent advances in understanding DA reward signals come
from considering three broad questions: How do DA neurons
learn reward predictions? How accurate are their predictions?
And just what do they treat as rewarding?
How do DA neurons learn reward predictions? Classic theo-
ries suggest that reward predictions are learned through a
gradual reinforcement process requiring repeated stimulus-
reward pairings (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Montague et al.,
1996). Each time stimulus A is followed by an unexpected
reward, the estimated value of A is increased. Recent data,
however, show that DA neurons go beyond simple stimulus-
reward learning and make predictions based on sophisticated
beliefs about the structure of the world. DA neurons can predict
rewards correctly even in unconventional environments where
rewards paired with a stimulus cause a decrease in the value
of that stimulus (Satoh et al., 2003; Nakahara et al., 2004;
Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010c) or cause a change in the value
of an entirely different stimulus (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010b).
Figure 1. Dopamine Coding of Reward Prediction
Errors and Preference for Predictive Information
(A) Conventional theories of DA reward signals. DA
neurons encode a reward prediction error signal, respond-
ing with phasic excitation when a situation’s reward value
becomes better than predicted (red) and phasic inhibition
when the value becomes worse than predicted (blue).
These signals could be used for learning, to reinforce or
punish previous actions (backward arrows), or for imme-
diate control of behavior, to promote or suppress
reward-seeking actions (forward arrows).
(B–E) An example DA neuron with conventional coding of
reward prediction errors as well as coding of the subjec-
tive preference for predictive information. Each plot shows
the neuron’s mean firing rate (histogram, top) and its
spikes on 20 individual trials (bottom rasters) during
each condition of the task. Data are fromBromberg-Martin
and Hikosaka (2009).
(B) This DA neuron was excited by a cue indicating that an
informative cue would appear to tell the size of a future
reward (red).
(C) DA excitation by a big reward cue (red), inhibition by
a small reward cue (blue), and no response to predictable
reward outcomes (black).
(D) This DA neuron was inhibited by a cue indicating that
an uninformative cue would appear that would leave the
reward size unpredictable (blue).
(E) DA lack of response to uninformative cues (black), exci-
tation by an unexpectedly big reward (red), and inhibition
by an unexpectedly small reward (blue).
Neuron
ReviewDA neurons can also adapt their reward signals based on higher-
order statistics of the reward distribution, such as scaling
prediction error signals based on their expected variance (Tobler
et al., 2005) and ‘‘spontaneously recovering’’ their responses to
extinguished reward cues (Pan et al., 2008). All of these
phenomena form a remarkable parallel to similar effects seen
in sensory and motor adaptation (Braun et al., 2010; Fairhall
et al., 2001; Shadmehr et al., 2010), suggesting that they may
reflect a general neural mechanism for predictive learning.
How accurate are DA reward predictions? Recent studies
have shown that DA neurons faithfully adjust their reward signals
to account for three sources of prediction uncertainty. First,
humans and animals suffer from internal timing noise that
prevents them from making reliable predictions about long
cue-reward time intervals (Gallistel and Gibbon, 2000). Thus, if
cue-reward delays are short (1–2 s) timing predictions are
accurate and reward delivery triggers little DA response, but if
cue-reward delays are longer, timing predictions become less
reliable and rewards evoke clear DA bursts (Kobayashi and
Schultz, 2008; Fiorillo et al., 2008). Second, many cues in
everyday life are imprecise, specifying a broad distribution ofNeuroreward delivery times. DA neurons again
reflect this form of timing uncertainty: they are
progressively inhibited during variable reward
delays, as though signaling increasingly nega-
tive reward prediction errors at each moment
the reward fails to appear (Fiorillo et al., 2008;
Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010a; Nomoto et al.,
2010). Finally, many cues are perceptually
complex, requiring detailed inspection to reach
a firm conclusion about their reward value. Insuch situations DA reward signals occur at long latencies and
in a gradual fashion, appearing to reflect the gradual flow of
perceptual information as the stimulus value is decoded (Nom-
oto et al., 2010).
Just what events do DA neurons treat as rewarding? Conven-
tional theories of reward learning suggest that DA neurons assign
value based on the expected amount of future primary reward
(Montague et al., 1996). Yet evenwhen the rate of primary reward
is held constant, humans and animals often express an addi-
tional preference for predictability—seeking environments
where each reward’s size, probability, and timing can be known
in advance (Daly, 1992; Chew and Ho, 1994; Ahlbrecht and
Weber, 1996). A recent study in monkeys found that DA neurons
signal this preference (Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka, 2009).
Monkeys expressed a strong preference to view informative
visual cues that would allow them to predict the size of a future
reward, rather than uninformative cues that provided no new
information. In parallel, DA neurons were excited by the opportu-
nity to view the informative cues in a manner that was correlated
with the animal’s behavioral preference (Figures 1B and 1D). This
suggests that DA neurons not only motivate actions to gainn 68, December 9, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 817
Figure 2. Dopamine Control of Positive and
Negative Motivation in the Dorsal Striatum
(A) If an action is followed by a new situation that is
better than predicted, DA neurons fire a burst of
spikes. This is thought to activate D1 receptors
on direct pathway neurons, promoting immediate
action as well as reinforcing corticostriatal
synapses to promote selection of that action in
the future.
(B) If an action is followed by a new situation that
is worse than predicted, DA neurons pause their
spiking activity. This is thought to inhibit D2 recep-
tors on indirect pathway neurons, promoting sup-
pression of immediate action as well as reinforcing
corticostriatal synapses to promote suppression
of that action in the future.
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about those rewards, in order to ensure that rewards can be
properly anticipated and prepared for in advance.
Taken together, these findings show that DA reward prediction
error signals are sensitive to sophisticated factors that inform
human and animal reward predictions, including adaptation to
high-order reward statistics, reward uncertainty, and prefer-
ences for predictive information.
Effects of Phasic Dopamine Reward Signals
on Downstream Structures
DA reward responses occur in synchronous phasic bursts
(Joshua et al., 2009b), a response pattern that shapes DA release
in target structures (Gonon, 1988; Zhang et al., 2009; Tsai et al.,
2009). It has long been theorized that these phasic bursts
influence learning and motivation in a distinct manner from tonic
DA activity (Grace, 1991; Grace et al., 2007; Schultz, 2007; Lap-
ish et al., 2007). Recently developed technology has made it
possible to confirm this hypothesis by controlling DA neuron
activity with fine spatial and temporal precision. Optogenetic
stimulation of VTA DA neurons induces a strong conditioned
place preference that only occurs when stimulation is applied
in a bursting pattern (Tsai et al., 2009). Conversely, genetic
knockout of NMDA receptors from DA neurons, which impairs
bursting while leaving tonic activity largely intact, causes a selec-
tive impairment in specific forms of reward learning (Zweifel
et al., 2009; Parker et al., 2010) (although note that this knockout
also impairs DA neuron synaptic plasticity; Zweifel et al., 2008).
DA bursts may enhance reward learning by reconfiguring local
neural circuits. Notably, reward-predictive DA bursts are sent
to specific regions of the nucleus accumbens, and these regions
have especially high levels of reward-predictive neural activity
(Cheer et al., 2007; Owesson-White et al., 2009).
Compared to phasic bursts, less is known about the impor-
tance of phasic pauses in spiking activity for negative reward
prediction errors. These pauses cause smaller changes in spike
rate, are less modulated by reward expectation (Bayer and818 Neuron 68, December 9, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.Glimcher, 2005; Joshua et al., 2009a;
Nomoto et al., 2010), and may have
smaller effects on learning (Rutledge
et al., 2009). However, certain types of
negative prediction error learning require
the VTA (Takahashi et al., 2009), suggest-ing that phasic pauses may still be decoded by downstream
structures.
Since bursts and pauses cause very different patterns of DA
release, they are likely to influence downstream structures
through distinct mechanisms. There is recent evidence for
this hypothesis in one major target of DA neurons, the dorsal
striatum. Dorsal striatum projection neurons come in two types
that express different DA receptors. One type expresses D1
receptors and projects to the basal ganglia ‘‘direct pathway’’
to facilitate body movements; the second type expresses D2
receptors and projects to the ‘‘indirect pathway’’ to suppress
body movements (Figure 2) (Albin et al., 1989; Gerfen et al.,
1990; Kravitz et al., 2010; Hikida et al., 2010). Based on the
properties of these pathways and receptors, it has been theo-
rized that DA bursts produce conditions of high DA, activate
D1 receptors, and cause the direct pathway to select high-value
movements (Figure 2A), whereas DA pauses produce conditions
of low DA, inhibit D2 receptors, and cause the indirect pathway
to suppress low-value movements (Figure 2B) (Frank, 2005; Hi-
kosaka, 2007). Consistent with this hypothesis, high DA receptor
activation promotes potentiation of corticostriatal synapses
onto the direct pathway (Shen et al., 2008) and learning from
positive outcomes (Frank et al., 2004; Voon et al., 2010), while
striatal D1 receptor blockade selectively impairs movements to
rewarded targets (Nakamura and Hikosaka, 2006). In an analo-
gous manner, low DA receptor activation promotes potentiation
of corticostriatal synapses onto the indirect pathway (Shen et al.,
2008) and learning from negative outcomes (Frank et al., 2004;
Voon et al., 2010), while striatal D2 receptor blockade selectively
suppresses movements to nonrewarded targets (Nakamura and
Hikosaka, 2006). This division of D1 and D2 receptor functions in
motivational control explains many of the effects of DA-related
genes on human behavior (Ullsperger, 2010; Frank and Fossella,
2010) and may extend beyond the dorsal striatum, as there is
evidence for a similar division of labor in the ventral striatum
(Grace et al., 2007; Lobo et al., 2010).
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control of behavior through its effects on the striatum, the full
picture is much more complex. DA influences reward-related
behavior by acting onmany brain regions including the prefrontal
cortex (Hitchcott et al., 2007), rhinal cortex (Liu et al., 2004),
hippocampus (Packard and White, 1991; Grecksch and Matties,
1981), and amygdala (Phillips et al., 2010). The effects of DA are
likely to differ widely between these regions because of varia-
tions in the density of DA innervation, DA transporters, metabolic
enzymes, autoreceptors, receptors, and receptor coupling to
intracellular signaling pathways (Neve et al., 2004; Bentivoglio
and Morelli, 2005; Frank and Fossella, 2010). Furthermore, at
least in the VTA, DA neurons can have different cellular proper-
ties depending on their projection targets (Lammel et al., 2008;
Margolis et al., 2008), and some have the remarkable ability to
transmit glutamate as well as dopamine (Descarries et al.,
2008; Chuhma et al., 2009; Hnasko et al., 2010; Tecuapetla
et al., 2010; Stuber et al., 2010; Birgner et al., 2010). Thus, the
full extent of DA neuron control over neural processing is only
beginning to be revealed.
Dopamine: Beyond Reward
Thus far we have discussed the role of DA neurons in reward-
related behavior, founded upon dopamine responses resem-
bling reward prediction errors. It has become increasingly clear,
however, that DA neurons phasically respond to several types of
events that are not intrinsically rewarding and are not cues to
future rewards, and that these nonreward signals have an impor-
tant role in motivational processing. These nonreward events
can be grouped into two broad categories, aversive and alerting,
which we will discuss in detail below. Aversive events include
intrinsically undesirable stimuli (such as air puffs, bitter tastes,
electrical shocks, and other unpleasant sensations) and sensory
cues that have gained aversive properties through association
with these events. Alerting events are unexpected sensory
cues of high potential importance, which generally trigger
immediate reactions to determine their meaning.
Diverse Dopamine Responses to Aversive Events
A neuron’s response to aversive events provides a crucial test of
its functions in motivational control (Schultz, 1998; Berridge and
Robinson, 1998; Redgrave et al., 1999; Horvitz, 2000; Joseph
et al., 2003). In many respects we treat rewarding and aversive
events in opposite manners, reflecting their opposite motiva-
tional value. We seek rewards and assign them positive value,
while we avoid aversive events and assign them negative value.
In other respects we treat rewarding and aversive events in
similar manners, reflecting their similar motivational salience.
Both rewarding and aversive events trigger orienting of attention,
cognitive processing, and increases in general motivation. Note
that by motivational salience we mean a quantity that is high for
both rewarding and aversive events and is low for motivationally
neutral (nonrewarding and nonaversive) events (Berridge and
Robinson, 1998). This is distinct from other notions of salience
used in neuroscience, such as incentive salience, which applies
only to desirable events (Berridge and Robinson, 1998), and
perceptual salience, which applies to motivationally neutral
features of a stimulus such its orientation or color (Bisley and
Goldberg, 2010).Which of these functions do DA neurons support? It has long
been known that stressful and aversive experiences cause large
changes in DA concentrations in downstream brain structures,
and that behavioral reactions to these experiences are dramati-
cally altered by DA agonists, antagonists, and lesions (Sala-
mone, 1994; Di Chiara, 2002; Pezze and Feldon, 2004; Young
et al., 2005). These studies have produced a striking diversity
of results, however (Levita et al., 2002; Di Chiara, 2002; Young
et al., 2005). Many studies are consistent with DA neurons en-
coding motivational salience. They report that aversive events
increase DA levels and that behavioral aversion is supported
by high levels of DA transmission (Salamone, 1994; Joseph
et al., 2003; Ventura et al., 2007; Barr et al., 2009; Fadok et al.,
2009) including phasic DA bursts (Zweifel et al., 2009). But other
studies are more consistent with DA neurons encoding motiva-
tional value. They report that aversive events reduce DA levels
and that behavioral aversion is supported by low levels of DA
transmission (Mark et al., 1991; Shippenberg et al., 1991; Liu
et al., 2008; Roitman et al., 2008). In many cases these mixed
results have been found in single studies, indicating that aversive
experiences cause different patterns of DA release in different
brain structures (Thierry et al., 1976; Besson and Louilot, 1995;
Ventura et al., 2001; Jeanblanc et al., 2002; Bassareo et al.,
2002; Pascucci et al., 2007), and that DA-related drugs can
produce a mixture of neural and behavioral effects similar to
those caused by both rewarding and aversive experiences
(Ettenberg, 2004; Wheeler et al., 2008).
This diversity of DA release patterns and functions is difficult
to reconcile with the idea that DA neurons transmit a uniform
motivational signal to all brain structures. These diverse
responses could be explained, however, if DA neurons are them-
selves diverse—composed of multiple neural populations that
support different aspects of aversive processing. This view is
supported by neural recording studies in anesthetized animals.
These studies have shown that noxious stimuli evoke excitation
in some DA neurons but inhibition in other DA neurons (Chiodo
et al., 1980; Maeda and Mogenson, 1982; Schultz and Romo,
1987; Mantz et al., 1989; Gao et al., 1990; Coizet et al., 2006).
Importantly, both excitatory and inhibitory responses occur in
neurons confirmed to be dopaminergic by juxtacellular labeling
(Brischoux et al., 2009) (Figure 3). A similar diversity of aversive
responses occurs during active behavior. Different groups of
DA neurons are phasically excited or inhibited by aversive
events including noxious stimulation of the skin (Kiyatkin,
1988a; Kiyatkin, 1988b), sensory cues predicting aversive
shocks (Guarraci and Kapp, 1999), aversive airpuffs (Matsumoto
and Hikosaka, 2009b), and sensory cues predicting aversive
airpuffs (Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009b; Joshua et al., 2009a).
Furthermore, when two DA neurons are recorded simulta-
neously, their aversive responses generally have little trial-to-trial
correlation with each other (Joshua et al., 2009b), suggesting
that aversive responses are not coordinated across the DA
population as a whole.
To understand the functions of these diverse aversive
responses, we need to know how they are combinedwith reward
responses to generate ameaningful motivational signal. A recent
study investigated this topic and revealed that DA neurons are
divided into multiple populations with distinct motivationalNeuron 68, December 9, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 819
Figure 3. Diverse Dopamine Neuron Responses to Noxious Events
Two example DA neurons in the VTA that were phasically inhibited (top) or
excited (bottom) by noxious footshocks. These neurons were recorded in
anesthetized rats and were confirmed to be dopaminergic by juxtacellular
labeling. Adapted with permission from Brischoux et al. (2009).
Figure 4. Distinct Dopamine Neuron Populations Encoding
Motivational Value and Salience
(A) Motivational value-coding DA neurons were excited by reward cues and
reward outcomes (fruit juice) and inhibited by aversive cues and aversive
outcomes (airpuffs).
(B) Motivational salience-coding DA neurons were excited by both reward and
aversive cues and outcomes. Analysis and classification of neurons adapted
from Bromberg-Martin et al. (2010a); original data are from Matsumoto and
Hikosaka (2009b).
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excited by rewarding events and inhibited by aversive events,
as though encoding motivational value (Figure 4A). A second
population is excited by both rewarding and aversive events in
similar manners, as though encoding motivational salience
(Figure 4B). In both of these populations, many neurons are
sensitive to reward and aversive predictions: they respond
when rewarding events are more rewarding than predicted and
when aversive events are more aversive than predicted (Matsu-
moto and Hikosaka, 2009b). This shows that their aversive
responses are truly caused by predictions about aversive
events, ruling out the possibility that they could be caused by
nonspecific factors such as raw sensory input or generalized
associations with reward (Schultz, 2010). These two populations
differ, however, in the detailed nature of their predictive code.
Motivational value-coding DA neurons encode an accurate
prediction error signal, including strong inhibition by omission
of rewards and mild excitation by omission of aversive events
(Figure 4A, right). In contrast, motivational salience-coding DA
neurons do not respond to all types of prediction errors: they
are excited when salient events are present but have little or
no response when they are omitted (Figure 4B, right). This
activity is consistent with theoretical notions of arousal (Lang
and Davis, 2006) and bears some resemblance to theorized
‘‘changes in stimulus associability’’ that are thought to guide
associative learning (Pearce and Hall, 1980), although this
activity only occurs for the subset of trials when salient events
are present. Evidence for these two DA neuron populations
has been observed even when neural activity has been exam-
ined in an averaged manner. Thus, studies targeting different
parts of the DA system found phasic DA signals encoding aver-820 Neuron 68, December 9, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.sive events with inhibition (Roitman et al., 2008), similar to coding
of motivational value, or with excitation (Joshua et al., 2008;
Anstrom et al., 2009), similar to coding of motivational salience.
These recent findings might appear to contradict an early
report that DA neurons respond preferentially to reward cues
rather than aversive cues (Mirenowicz and Schultz, 1996).
When examined closely, however, even that study is fully
consistent with DA value and salience coding. In that study
reward cues led to reward outcomes with high probability
(>90%) while aversive cues led to aversive outcomes with low
probability (<10%). Hence value- and salience-coding DA
neurons would have little response to the aversive cues, accu-
rately encoding their low level of aversiveness.
Functional Role of Motivational Value
and Salience Signals
Taken together, the above findings indicate that DA neurons are
divided into multiple populations suitable for distinct roles in
motivational control. Motivational value-coding DA neurons fit
well with current theories of dopamine neurons and reward
processing (Schultz et al., 1997; Berridge and Robinson, 1998;
Wise, 2004). These neurons encode a complete prediction error
signal and encode rewarding and aversive events in opposite
directions. Thus these neurons provide an appropriate instruc-
tive signal for seeking, evaluation, and value learning (Figure 5).
If a stimulus causes value-coding DA neurons to be excited
then we should approach it, assign it high value, and learn
actions to seek it again in the future. If a stimulus causes
value-coding DA neurons to be inhibited then we should avoid
it, assign it low value, and learn actions to avoid it again in the
future.
In contrast, motivational salience-coding DA neurons fit well
with theories of dopamine neurons and processing of salient
events (Redgrave et al., 1999; Horvitz, 2000; Joseph et al.,
2003; Kapur, 2003). These neurons are excited by both
Figure 5. Hypothesized Functions of Motivational Value, Salience,
and Alerting Signals
Hypothesized functions of motivational signals in DA neurons. Motivational
value signals are sent to value-coding DA neurons that instruct seeking of
rewards, evaluation of outcomes, and value learning. Motivational salience
signals are sent to salience-coding DA neurons that support attentional orient-
ing, cognitive processing, and general motivation. Alerting signals are sent
to both populations. In value-coding DA neurons they promote seeking of
environments where alerting cues are available so that salient outcomes can
be anticipated in advance. In salience-coding DA neurons they implement
this anticipation by promoting orienting to alerting cues and deployment of
cognitive and motivational resources.
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to neutral events, providing an appropriate instructive signal
for neural circuitry to learn to detect, predict, and respond to
situations of high importance. Here we will consider three such
brain systems (Figure 5). First, neural circuits for visual and
attentional orienting are calibrated to discover information about
all types of events, both rewarding and aversive. For instance,
both reward and aversive cues attract orienting reactions
more effectively than neutral cues (Lang and Davis, 2006;
Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009b; Austin and Duka, 2010).
Second, both rewarding and aversive situations engage neural
systems for cognitive control and action selection—we need to
engage working memory to hold information in mind, conflict
resolution to decide upon a course of action, and long-term
memory to remember the resulting outcome (Bradley et al.,
1992; Botvinick et al., 2001; Savine et al., 2010). Third, both
rewarding and aversive situations require an increase in general
motivation to energize actions and to ensure that they are
executed properly. Indeed, DA neurons are critical in motivating
effort to achieve high-value goals and in translating knowledge of
task demands into reliable motor performance (Berridge and
Robinson, 1998; Mazzoni et al., 2007; Niv et al., 2007; Salamone
et al., 2007).
Dopamine Excitation by Alerting Sensory Cues
In addition to their signals encoding motivational value and
salience, the majority of DA neurons also have burst responses
to several types of sensory events that are not directly associ-
ated with rewarding or aversive experiences. These responses
have been theorized to depend on a number of neural and
psychological factors, including direct sensory input, surprise,
novelty, arousal, attention, salience, generalization, and pseudo-
conditioning (Schultz, 1998; Redgrave et al., 1999; Horvitz, 2000;Lisman and Grace, 2005; Redgrave and Gurney, 2006; Joshua
et al., 2009a; Schultz, 2010).
Here wewill attempt to synthesize these ideas and account for
these DA responses in terms of a single underlying signal, an
alerting signal (Figure 5). The term ‘‘alerting’’ was used by Schultz
(Schultz, 1998) as a general term for events that attract attention.
Here we will use it in a more specific sense. By an alerting event,
we mean an unexpected sensory cue that captures attention
based on a rapid assessment of its potential importance, using
simple features such as its location, size, and sensory modality.
Such alerting events often trigger immediate behavioral reac-
tions to investigate them and determine their precise meaning.
Thus DA alerting signals typically occur at short latencies, are
based on the rough features of a stimulus, and are best
correlated with immediate reactions such as orienting reactions
(Schultz and Romo, 1990; Joshua et al., 2009a; Schultz, 2010).
This is in contrast to other motivational signals in DA neurons
that typically occur at longer latencies, take into account the
precise identity of the stimulus, and are best correlated with
considered behavioral actions such as decisions to approach
or avoid (Schultz and Romo, 1990; Joshua et al., 2009a; Schultz,
2010).
DA neuron alerting responses can be triggered by surprising
sensory events such as unexpected light flashes and auditory
clicks, which evoke prominent burst excitations in 60%–90%
of DA neurons throughout the SNc and VTA (Strecker and
Jacobs, 1985; Horvitz et al., 1997; Horvitz, 2000) (Figure 6A).
These alerting responses seem to reflect the degree to which
the stimulus is surprising and captures attention; they are
reduced if a stimulus occurs at predictable times, if attention is
engaged elsewhere, or during sleep (Schultz, 1998; Takikawa
et al., 2004; Strecker and Jacobs, 1985; Steinfels et al., 1983).
For instance, an unexpected clicking sound evokes a prominent
DA burst when a cat is in a passive state of quiet waking but has
no effect when the cat is engaged in attention-demanding activ-
ities such as hunting a rat, feeding, grooming, being petted by
the experimenter, and so on (Strecker and Jacobs, 1985) (Fig-
ure 6A). Similarly, DA burst responses are triggered by sensory
events that are physically weak but are alerting because of their
novelty (Ljungberg et al., 1992; Schultz, 1998). These responses
habituate as the novel stimulus becomes familiar, in parallel with
the habituation of orienting reactions (Figure 6B). Consistent with
these findings, surprising and novel events evoke DA release in
downstream structures (Lisman and Grace, 2005) and activate
DA-related brain circuits in a manner that shapes reward
processing (Zink et al., 2003; Davidson et al., 2004; Duzel
et al., 2010).
DA neuron alerting responses are also triggered by unex-
pected sensory cues that have the potential to provide new infor-
mation about motivationally salient events. As expected for a
short-latency alerting signal, these responses are rather nonse-
lective: they are triggered by any stimulus that merely
resembles a motivationally salient cue, even if the resemblance
is very slight (a phenomenon called generalization) (Schultz,
1998). As a result, DA neurons often respond to a stimulus with
a mixture of two signals: a fast alerting signal encoding the fact
that the stimulus is potentially important, and a second signal en-
coding its actual rewarding or aversive meaning (Schultz andNeuron 68, December 9, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 821
Figure 6. Dopamine Neuron Excitatory
Responses to Alerting Events
DA neurons are excited by sensory cues that are
alerting (left, black) but do not respond when the
same cues are rendered nonalerting (right, gray).
(A) A DA neuron fired bursts in response to an
unexpected 113 dB auditory click. These bursts
occurred when the cat was in a state of quiet
waking, but not when the cat was preoccupied
by the presence of inaccessible food. Adapted
with permission from Strecker and Jacobs (1985).
(B) A DA neuron fired bursts in response to a new
sensory stimulus (a door opening). These bursts
occurred when it was relatively novel (presenta-
tions 12–33) but not when it was familiar (presenta-
tions 56–75). Histograms were built with data from
a neuron reported in Ljungberg et al. (1992), adap-
ted with permission from the Am. Physiol. Society.
(C and D) DA neurons that were excited by unex-
pected visual cues during tasks when the cues
were potentially rewarding or aversive. In separate
blocks of trials, animals were presented with cues
and outcomes that were potentially rewarding
(top, reward task) or aversive (bottom, aversive
task). Data are the averaged activity of four moti-
vational salience-coding DA neurons; for clarity,
stimulus colors have been modified and only
a subset of conditions are shown. Adapted from
Bromberg-Martin et al. (2010a).
(C) In a first experiment, motivational cues were
presented with unpredictable timing. The DA
neurons were excited by all cues, even a neutral
cue (black curve) that had never been paired
with rewarding or aversive outcomes.
(D) In a second experiment, the timing of motiva-
tional cues was made fully predictable by present-
ing a ‘‘trial start cue’’ one second in advance. The
DA neurons were no longer excited by the neutral
cue (right, gray); instead, their excitation shifted to
the trial start cue (left, black).
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2007; Kobayashi and Schultz, 2008; Fiorillo et al., 2008; Nomoto
et al., 2010) (for review see Kakade and Dayan, 2002; Joshua
et al., 2009a; Schultz, 2010). An example can be seen in a set
of motivational salience-coding DA neurons shown in
Figure 6C (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010a). These neurons were
excited by reward and aversive cues, but they were also excited
by a neutral cue. The neutral cue had never been paired with
motivational outcomes but did have a (very slight) physical
resemblance to the reward and aversive cues.
These alerting responses seem closely tied to a sensory cue’s
ability to trigger orienting reactions to examine it further and
discover its meaning. This can be seen in three notable proper-
ties. First, alerting responses only occur for sensory cues that
have to be examined to determine their meaning, not for intrinsi-
cally rewarding or aversive events such as delivery of juice or
airpuffs (Schultz, 2010). Second, alerting responses only occur
when a cue is potentially important and has the ability to trigger
orienting reactions, not when the cue is irrelevant to the task at
hand and fails to trigger orienting reactions (Schultz and Romo,
1990). Third, alerting responses are enhanced in situations822 Neuron 68, December 9, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.when cues would trigger an abrupt shift
of attention—when they appear at an
unexpected time or away from the centerof gaze (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010a). Thus when motivational
cues are presentedwith unpredictable timing, they trigger imme-
diate orienting reactions and a generalized DA alerting
response—excitation by all cues including neutral cues (Fig-
ure 6C, black). But if their timing is made predictable—for
example, by forewarning the subjects with a ‘‘trial start cue’’ pre-
sented one second before the cues appear—the cues no longer
evoke an alerting response (Figure 6D, gray). Instead, the alerting
response shifts to the trial start cue—the first event of the trial
that has unpredictable timing and evokes orienting reactions
(Figure 6D, black).
What is the underlying mechanism that generates DA neuron
alerting signals? One hypothesis is that alerting responses are
simply conventional reward prediction error signals that occur
at short latencies, encoding the expected reward value of a
stimulus before it has been fully discriminated (Kakade and
Dayan, 2002). More recent evidence, however, suggests that
alerting signals can be generated by a distinct mechanism from
conventional DA reward signals (Satoh et al., 2003; Bayer and
Glimcher, 2005; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010a, 2010c; Nomoto
et al., 2010). Most strikingly, the alerting response to the trial start
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Reviewcue is not restricted to rewarding tasks; it canhave equal strength
during anaversive task inwhich no rewards aredelivered (Figures
6C and 6D, bottom, ‘‘aversive task’’). This occurs even though
conventional DA reward signals in the same neurons correctly
signal that the rewarding task has a much higher expected value
than the aversive task (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010a). These
alerting signals are not purely a form of value coding or purely
a form of salience coding, because they occur in the majority of
bothmotivational value- and salience-coding DAneurons (Brom-
berg-Martin et al., 2010a). A second dissociation can be seen in
the way that DA neurons predict future rewards based on the
memory of past reward outcomes (Satoh et al., 2003; Bayer
and Glimcher, 2005). Whereas conventional DA reward signals
are controlled by a long-timescale memory trace optimized for
accurate reward prediction, alerting responses to the trial start
cue are controlled by a separate memory trace resembling that
seen in immediate orienting reactions (Bromberg-Martin et al.,
2010c). A third dissociation can be seen in the way that these
signals are distributed across the DA neuron population.
WhereasconventionalDA rewardsignals in theSNcare strongest
in its ventromedial portion, alerting responses to the trial start cue
(and to other unexpectedly timed cues) are broadcast throughout
the SNc (Nomoto et al., 2010).
In contrast to these dissociations from conventional reward
signals, DA alerting signals are correlated with the speed of
orienting and approach responses to the alerting event (Satoh
et al., 2003; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010a; Bromberg-Martin
et al., 2010c). This suggests that alerting signals are generated
by a neural process that motivates fast reactions to investigate
potentially important events. At the present time, unfortunately,
relatively little is known about precisely what events this process
treats as ‘‘important.’’ For example, are alerting responses equally
sensitive to rewardingandaversiveevents?Alerting responsesare
known to occur for stimuli that resemble reward cues or that
resemble both reward and aversive cues (e.g., by sharing the
same sensory modality). But it is not yet known whether alerting
responses occur for stimuli that solely resemble aversive cues.
Functional Role of Dopamine Alerting Signals
As we have seen, alerting signals are likely to be generated by
a distinct mechanism from motivational value and salience
signals. However, alerting signals are sent to both motivational
value- and salience-coding DA neurons, and therefore are likely
to regulate brain processing and behavior in a similar manner to
value and salience signals (Figure 5).
Alerting signals sent to motivational salience-coding DA
neurons would support orienting of attention to the alerting stim-
ulus, engage cognitive resources to discover its meaning and
decide on a plan for action, and increase motivation levels to
implement this plan efficiently (Figure 5). These effects could
occur through immediate effects on neural processing or by re-
inforcing actions that led to detection of the alerting event. This
functional role fits well with the correlation between DA alerting
responses and fast behavioral reactions to the alerting stimulus,
and with theories that short-latency DA neuron responses are
involved in orienting of attention, arousal, enhancement of cogni-
tive processing, and immediate behavioral reactions (Redgrave
et al., 1999; Horvitz, 2000; Joseph et al., 2003; Lisman and
Grace, 2005; Redgrave and Gurney, 2006; Joshua et al., 2009a).The presence of alerting signals in motivational value-coding
DA neurons is more difficult to explain. These neurons transmit
motivational value signals that are ideal for seeking, evaluation
of outcomes, and value learning; yet they can also be excited
by alerting events such as unexpected clicking sounds and the
onset of aversive trials. According to our hypothesized pathway
(Figure 5), this would cause alerting events to be assigned
positive value and to be sought after in a manner similar to
rewards! While surprising at first glance, there is reason to
suspect that alerting events can be treated as positive goals.
Alerting signals provide the first warning that a potentially
important event is about to occur and hence provide the first
opportunity to take action to control that event. If alerting cues
are available, motivationally salient events can be detected,
predicted, and prepared for in advance; if alerting cues are
absent, motivationally salient events always occur as an unex-
pected surprise. Indeed, humans and animals often express
a preference for environments where rewarding, aversive, and
even motivationally neutral sensory events can be observed
and predicted in advance (Badia et al., 1979; Herry et al., 2007;
Daly, 1992; Chew and Ho, 1994) and many DA neurons signal
the behavioral preference to view reward-predictive information
(Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka, 2009). DA alerting signals may
support these preferences by assigning positive value to
environments where potentially important sensory cues can be
anticipated in advance.
Neural Pathways for Motivational Value, Salience,
and Alerting
Thus far we have divided DA neurons into two types that encode
motivational value and motivational salience and are suitable for
distinct roles in motivational control (Figure 5). How does this
conceptual scheme map onto neural pathways in the brain?
Here we propose a hypothesis about the anatomical locations
of these neurons, their projections to downstream structures,
and the sources of their motivational signals (Figures 6 and 7).
Anatomical Locations of Value- and Salience-Coding
Neurons
A recent study mapped the locations of DA reward and aversive
signals in the lateral midbrain including the SNc and lateralmost
part of the VTA (Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009b). Motivational
value and motivational salience signals were distributed across
this region in an anatomical gradient. Motivational value signals
were found more commonly in neurons in the ventromedial
SNc and lateral VTA, while motivational salience signals were
found more commonly in neurons in the dorsolateral SNc
(Figure 7B). This is consistent with reports that DA reward value
coding is strongest in the ventromedial SNc (Nomoto et al.,
2010), while aversive excitations tend to be strongest more
laterally (Mirenowicz and Schultz, 1996). Other studies have
explored the more medial midbrain. These studies found a
mixture of excitatory and inhibitory aversive responses with no
significant difference in their locations, although with a trend
for aversive excitations to be located more ventrally (Guarraci
and Kapp, 1999; Brischoux et al., 2009) (Figure 7C).
Destinations of Motivational Value Signals
According to our hypothesis, motivational value-coding DA
neurons should project to brain regions involved in approachNeuron 68, December 9, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 823
Figure 7. Hypothesized Anatomical Location and Projections
of Dopamine Motivational Value- and Salience-Coding Neurons
(A) In our hypothesis, motivational salience-coding DA neurons are located
predominantly in the dorsolateral SNc and medial VTA. They may send signals
to regions of the nucleus accumbens core (NAc core), dorsal striatum, and
dorsal and lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Motivational value-coding DA
neurons are located predominantly in the ventromedial SNc and throughout
the VTA. They may send signals to regions of the nucleus accumbens shell
(NAc shell), dorsal striatum, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC).
(B) DA excitatory responses to aversive cues (red dots) often occur in the
dorsolateral SNc, while inhibitory responses (blue dots) often occur in the
ventromedial SNc. Data are from one monkey and collapsed across three
adjacent 1 mm sections. Also labeled are the substantia nigra pars reticulata
(SNr) and red nucleus (RN). Adapted from Matsumoto and Hikosaka (2009b).
(C) DA neurons with greater excitation (red dots) or inhibition (blue dots) to
aversive cues than neutral cues are mixed within the medial VTA. Also shown
are neurons that had greater responses to neutral cues than aversive cues
(gray dots). Also labeled is the fasciculus retroflexus (fr). Data are from
eight rabbits and collapsed across three adjacent sections. Adapted with
permission from Guarraci and Kapp (1999).
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Reviewand avoidance actions, evaluation of outcomes, and value
learning (Figure 5). Indeed, the ventromedial SNc and VTA
project to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Williams and
Goldman-Rakic, 1998) including the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)
(Porrino and Goldman-Rakic, 1982) (Figure 7A). The OFC has
been consistently implicated in value coding in functional
imaging studies (Anderson et al., 2003; Small et al., 2003; Jensen
et al., 2007; Litt et al., 2010) and single-neuron recordings
(Morrison and Salzman, 2009; Roesch and Olson, 2004). The
OFC is thought to evaluate choice options (Padoa-Schioppa,
2007; Kable and Glimcher, 2009), encode outcome expectations
(Schoenbaum et al., 2009), and update these expectations
during learning (Walton et al., 2010). Furthermore, the OFC is
involved in learning from negative reward prediction errors824 Neuron 68, December 9, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.(Takahashi et al., 2009), which are strongest in value-coding
DA neurons (Figure 4).
In addition, the medial portions of the dopaminergic midbrain
project to the ventral striatum including the nucleus accumbens
shell (NAc shell) (Haber et al., 2000) (Figure 7A). A recent study
demonstrated that the NAc shell receives phasic DA signals
encoding the motivational value of taste outcomes (Roitman
et al., 2008). These signals are likely to cause value learning
because direct infusion of DA drugs into the NAc shell is strongly
reinforcing (Ikemoto, 2010) while treatments that reduce DA
input to the shell can induce aversions (Liu et al., 2008). One
caveat is that studies of NAc shell DA release over long time-
scales (minutes) have produced mixed results, some consistent
with value coding and others with salience coding (e.g., Bas-
sareo et al., 2002; Ventura et al., 2007). This suggests that value
signals may be restricted to specific locations within the NAc
shell. Notably, different regions of the NAc shell are specialized
for controlling appetitive and aversive behavior (Reynolds and
Berridge, 2002), which both require input from DA neurons
(Faure et al., 2008).
Finally, DA neurons throughout the extent of the SNc send
heavy projections to the dorsal striatum (Haber et al., 2000), sug-
gesting that the dorsal striatum may receive both motivational
value- and salience-coding DA signals (Figure 7A). Motivational
value-coding DA neurons would provide an ideal instructive
signal for striatal circuitry involved in value learning, such as
learning of stimulus-response habits (Faure et al., 2005; Yin
and Knowlton, 2006; Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010). When these
DA neurons burst, they would engage the direct pathway to learn
to gain reward outcomes; when they pause, they would engage
the indirect pathway to learn to avoid aversive outcomes
(Figure 2). Indeed, there is recent evidence that the striatal
pathways follow exactly this division of labor for reward and
aversive processing (Hikida et al., 2010). It is still unknown,
however, how neurons in these pathways respond to rewarding
and aversive events during behavior. At least in the dorsal
striatum as a whole, a subset of neurons respond to certain
rewarding and aversive events in distinct manners (Ravel et al.,
2003; Yamada et al., 2004, 2007; Joshua et al., 2008).
Destinations of Motivational Salience Signals
According to our hypothesis, motivational salience-coding DA
neurons should project to brain regions involved in orienting,
cognitive processing, and general motivation (Figure 5). Indeed,
DA neurons in the dorsolateral midbrain send projections to
dorsal and lateral frontal cortex (Williams and Goldman-Rakic,
1998) (Figure 7A), a region that has been implicated in cognitive
functions such as attentional search, working memory, cognitive
control, and decision making between motivational outcomes
(Williams and Castner, 2006; Lee and Seo, 2007; Wise, 2008;
Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Wallis and Kennerley, 2010). Dorso-
lateral prefrontal cognitive functions are tightly regulated by DA
levels (Robbins and Arnsten, 2009) and are theorized to depend
on phasic DA neuron activation (Cohen et al., 2002; Lapish et al.,
2007). Notably, a subset of lateral prefrontal neurons respond to
both rewarding and aversive visual cues, and the great majority
respond in the same direction resembling coding of motivational
salience (Kobayashi et al., 2006). Furthermore, the activity of
these neurons is correlated with behavioral success at
Figure 8. Hypothesized sources of motivational value, salience,
and alerting signals
In our hypothesis, motivational salience signals are sent to DA neurons through
the central amygdala (CeA). Motivational value and alerting signals may be
sent to DA neurons through a pathway including the globus pallidus border
(GPb), lateral habenula (LHb), and rostromedial tegmental nucleus (RMTg).
Value signals related to aversive outcomes may also be sent by the parabra-
chial nucleus (PBN), while alerting signals may also be sent by the superior
colliculus (SC) and pedunculopontine tegmental nucleus (PPTg).
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Although this dorsolateral DA/dorsolateral frontal cortex
pathway appears to be specific to primates (Williams and
Goldman-Rakic, 1998), a functionally similar pathway may exist
in other species. In particular, many of the cognitive functions of
the primate dorsolateral prefrontal cortex are performed by the
rodent medial prefrontal cortex (Uylings et al., 2003), and
there is evidence that this region receives DA motivational
salience signals and controls salience-related behavior (Mantz
et al., 1989; Di Chiara, 2002; Joseph et al., 2003; Ventura et al.,
2007, 2008).
Given the evidence that the VTA contains both salience- and
value-coding neurons and that value-coding signals are sent to
the NAc shell, salience signals might be sent to the NAc core
(Figure 7A). Indeed, the NAc core (but not shell) is crucial for
enabling motivation to overcome response costs such as
physical effort; for performance of set-shifting tasks requiring
cognitive flexibility; and for enabling reward cues to cause an
enhancement of general motivation (Ghods-Sharifi and Flor-
esco, 2010; Floresco et al., 2006; Hall et al., 2001; Cardinal,
2006). Consistent with coding of motivational salience, the NAc
core receives phasic bursts of DA during both rewarding experi-
ences (Day et al., 2007) and aversive experiences (Anstrom et al.,
2009).
Finally, as discussed above, some salience-coding DA
neurons may project to the dorsal striatum (Figure 7A). While
some regions of the dorsal striatum are involved in functions
related to learning action values, the dorsal striatum is also
involved in functions that should be engaged for all salient events,
such as orienting, attention, working memory, and general moti-
vation (Hikosaka et al., 2000; Klingberg, 2010; Palmiter, 2008).
Indeed, a subset of dorsal striatal neurons are more strongly
responsive to rewarding and aversive events than to neutral
events (Ravel et al., 1999; Blazquez et al., 2002; Yamada et al.,
2004, 2007), although their causal role in motivated behavior is
not yet known.
Sources of Motivational Value Signals
A recent series of studies suggests that DA neurons receive
motivational value signals from a small nucleus in the epithala-
mus, the lateral habenula (LHb) (Hikosaka, 2010) (Figure 8).
The LHb exerts potent negative control over DA neurons: LHb
stimulation inhibits DA neurons at short latencies (Christoph
et al., 1986) and can regulate learning in an opposite manner
to VTA stimulation (Shumake et al., 2010). Consistent with a
negative control signal, many LHb neurons have mirror-inverted
phasic responses to DA neurons: LHb neurons are inhibited by
positive reward prediction errors and excited by negative reward
prediction errors (Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2007, 2009a;
Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010a, 2010c). In several cases these
signals occur at shorter latencies in the LHb, consistent with
LHb / DA transmission (Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2007;
Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010a).
The LHb is capable of controlling DA neurons throughout the
midbrain, but several lines of evidence suggest that it exerts
preferential control over motivational value-coding DA neurons.
First, LHb neurons encodemotivational value in amanner closely
mirroring value-coding DA neurons—they encode both positive
and negative reward prediction errors and respond in oppositedirections to rewarding and aversive events (Matsumoto and
Hikosaka, 2009a; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010a). Second, LHb
stimulation has its most potent effects on DA neurons whose
properties are consistent with value coding, including inhibition
by no-reward cues and anatomical location in the ventromedial
SNc (Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2007, 2009b). Third, lesions to
the LHb impair DA neuron inhibitory responses to aversive
events, suggesting a causal role for the LHb in generating DA
value signals (Gao et al., 1990).
The LHb is part of a more extensive neural pathway by which
DA neurons can be controlled by the basal ganglia (Figure 8). The
LHb receives signals resembling reward prediction errors
through a projection from a population of neurons located
around the globus pallidus border (GPb) (Hong and Hikosaka,
2008). Once these signals reach the LHb they are likely to be
sent to DA neurons through a disynaptic pathway in which the
LHb excites midbrain GABA neurons that in turn inhibit DA
neurons (Ji and Shepard, 2007; Omelchenko et al., 2009;
Brinschwitz et al., 2010). This could occur through LHb projec-
tions to interneurons in the VTA and to an adjacent GABA-ergic
nucleus called the rostromedial tegmental nucleus (RMTg) (Jhou
et al., 2009b) (also called the ‘‘caudal tail of VTA’’; Kaufling et al.,
2009). Notably, RMTg neurons have response properties similar
to LHb neurons, encode motivational value, and have a heavy
inhibitory projection to dopaminergic midbrain (Jhou et al.,
2009a). Thus, the complete basal ganglia pathway to sendNeuron 68, December 9, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 825
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RMTg/DA (Hikosaka, 2010).
An important question for future research is whether motiva-
tional value signals are channeled solely through the LHb or
whether they are carried by multiple input pathways. Notably,
DA inhibitions by aversive footshocks are controlled by activity
in the mesopontine parabrachial nucleus (PBN) (Coizet et al.,
2010) (Figure 8). This nucleus contains neurons that receive
direct input from the spinal cord encoding noxious sensations
and could inhibit DA neurons through excitatory projections to
the RMTg (Coizet et al., 2010; Gauriau and Bernard, 2002).
This suggests that the LHb sends DA neurons motivational value
signals for both rewarding and aversive cues and outcomes
while the PBN provides a component of the value signal specif-
ically related to aversive outcomes.
Sources of Motivational Salience Signals
Less is known about the source of motivational salience signals
in DA neurons. One intriguing candidate is the central nucleus of
the amygdala (CeA), which has been consistently implicated in
orienting, attention, and general motivational responses during
both rewarding and aversive events (Holland and Gallagher,
1999; Baxter and Murray, 2002; Merali et al., 2003; Balleine
and Killcross, 2006) (Figure 8). The CeA and other amygdala
nuclei contain many neurons whose signals are consistent with
motivational salience: they signal rewarding and aversive events
in the same direction, are enhanced when events occur unex-
pectedly, and are correlated with behavioral measures of arousal
(Nishijo et al., 1988; Belova et al., 2007; Shabel and Janak, 2009).
These signals may be sent to DA neurons because the CeA has
descending projections to the brainstem that carry rewarding
and aversive information (Lee et al., 2005; Pascoe and Kapp,
1985) and the CeA regulates DA release during reward-related
events (Phillips et al., 2003a). Furthermore, the CeA participates
with DA neurons in pathways consistent with our proposed
anatomical and functional networks for motivational salience. A
pathway including the CeA, SNc, and dorsal striatum is neces-
sary for learned orienting to food cues (Han et al., 1997; Lee
et al., 2005; El-Amamy and Holland, 2007). Consistent with our
division of salience versus value signals, this pathway is needed
for learning to orient to food cues but not for learning to approach
food outcomes (Han et al., 1997). A second pathway, including
the CeA, SNc, VTA, and NAc core, is necessary for reward
cues to cause an increase in general motivation to perform
reward-seeking actions (Hall et al., 2001; Corbit and Balleine,
2005; El-Amamy and Holland, 2007).
In addition to the CeA, DA neurons could receive motivational
salience signals from other sources such as salience-coding
neurons in the basal forebrain (Lin and Nicolelis, 2008; Richard-
son and DeLong, 1991) and neurons in the PBN (Coizet et al.,
2010), although these pathways remain to be investigated.
Sources of Alerting Signals
There are several good candidates for providing DA neurons
with alerting signals. Perhaps the most attractive candidate is
the superior colliculus (SC), a midbrain nucleus that receives
short-latency sensory input from multiple sensory modalities
and controls orienting reactions and attention (Redgrave and
Gurney, 2006) (Figure 8). The SC has a direct projection to the
SNc and VTA (May et al., 2009; Comoli et al., 2003). In anesthe-826 Neuron 68, December 9, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.tized animals the SC is a vital conduit for short-latency visual
signals to reach DA neurons and trigger DA release in down-
stream structures (Comoli et al., 2003; Dommett et al., 2005).
The SC-DA pathway is best suited to convey alerting signals
rather than reward and aversion signals, as SC neurons have
little response to reward delivery and have only a mild influence
over DA aversive responses (Coizet et al., 2006). This suggests
a sequence of events in which SC neurons (1) detect a stimulus,
(2) select it as potentially important, (3) trigger an orienting
reaction to examine the stimulus, and (4) simultaneously trigger
a DA alerting response that causes a burst of DA in downstream
structures (Redgrave and Gurney, 2006).
A second candidate for sending alerting signals to DA neurons
is the LHb (Figure 8). Notably, the unexpected onset of a trial
start cue inhibits many LHb neurons in an inverse manner to
the DA neuron alerting signal, and this response occurs at
shorter latency in the LHb consistent with a LHb/DA direction
of transmission (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010a, 2010c). We
have also anecdotally observed that LHb neurons are commonly
inhibited by unexpected visual images and sounds in an inverse
manner to DA excitations (M.M., E.S.B.-M., and O.H., unpub-
lished data) although this awaits amore systematic investigation.
Finally, a third candidate for sending alerting signals to DA
neurons is the pedunculopontine tegmental nucleus (PPTg),
which projects to both the SNc and VTA and is involved in
motivational processing (Winn, 2006) (Figure 8). The PPTg is
important for enabling VTA DA neuron bursts (Grace et al.,
2007) including burst responses to reward cues (Pan and
Hyland, 2005). Consistent with an alerting signal, PPTg neurons
have short-latency responses to multiple sensory modalities and
are active during orienting reactions (Winn, 2006). There is
evidence that PPTg sensory responses are influenced by reward
value and by requirements for immediate action (Dormont et al.,
1998; Okada et al., 2009) (but see Pan and Hyland, 2005). Some
PPTg neurons also respond to rewarding or aversive outcomes
themselves (Dormont et al., 1998; Kobayashi et al., 2002; Ivlieva
and Timofeeva, 2003a, 2003b). It will be important to test
whether the signals the PPTg sends to DA neurons are related
specifically to alerting or whether they contain other motivational
signals such as value and salience.
Directions for Future Research
We have reviewed the nature of reward, aversive, and alerting
signals in DA neurons and have proposed a hypothesis about
the underlying neural pathways and their roles in motivated
behavior. We consider this to be a working hypothesis, a guide
for future theories and research that will bring us to a more
complete understanding. Here we will highlight several
areas where further investigation is needed to reveal deeper
complexities.
At the present time, our understanding of the neural pathways
underlying DA signals is at an early stage. Therefore, we have
attempted to infer the sources and destinations of value- and
salience-coding DA signals largely from indirect measures
such as the neural response properties and functional roles of
different brain areas. It will be important to put these candidate
pathways to a direct test and to discover their detailed pro-
perties, aided by recently developed tools that allow DA
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controlled (Tsai et al., 2009; Tecuapetla et al., 2010; Stuber
et al., 2010) with high spatial and temporal precision. As noted
above, several of these candidate structures have a topographic
organization, suggesting that their communication with DA
neurons might be topographic as well. The neural sources of
phasic DA signals may also be more complex than the simple
feedforward pathways we have proposed, since the neural
structures that communicate with DA neurons are densely
interconnected (Geisler and Zahm, 2005) and DA neurons can
communicate with each other within the midbrain (Ford et al.,
2010).
We have focused on a selected set of DA neuron connections,
but DA neurons receive functional input from many additional
structures including the subthalamic nucleus, laterodorsal
tegmental nucleus, bed nucleus of the stria terminalis, prefrontal
cortex, ventral pallidum, and lateral hypothalamus (Grace et al.,
2007;ShimoandWichmann, 2009; Jalabert et al., 2009).Notably,
lateral hypothalamus orexin neurons project to DA neurons, are
activated by rewarding rather than aversive events, and trigger
drug-seeking behavior (Harris and Aston-Jones, 2006), suggest-
ing a possible role in value-related functions. DA neurons also
send projections to many additional structures including the
hypothalamus, hippocampus, amygdala, habenula, and a great
many cortical areas. Notably, the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC) has been proposed to receive reward prediction error
signals from DA neurons (Holroyd and Coles, 2002) and contains
neurons with activity positively related to motivational value
(Koyamaet al., 1998). YetACCactivation is also linked to aversive
processing (Vogt, 2005; Johansen and Fields, 2004). These ACC
functions might be supported by a mixture of DA motivational
value and salience signals,whichwill be important to test in future
study. Indeed, neural signals related to reward prediction errors
have been reported in several areas including the medial
prefrontal cortex (Matsumoto et al., 2007; Seo and Lee, 2007),
orbitofrontal cortex (Sul et al., 2010; but see Takahashi et al.,
2009; Kennerley and Wallis, 2009), and dorsal striatum (Kim
et al., 2009; Oyama et al., 2010), and their causal relationship to
DA neuron activity remains to be discovered.
We have described motivational events with a simple
dichotomy, classifying them as ‘‘rewarding’’ or ‘‘aversive.’’ Yet
these categories contain great variety. An aversive illness is
gradual, prolonged, and caused by internal events; an aversive
airpuff is fast, brief, and caused by the external world. These
situations demand very different behavioral responses that are
likely to be supported by different neural systems. Furthermore,
although we have focused our discussion on two types of DA
neurons with signals resemblingmotivational value and salience,
a close examination shows that DA neurons are not limited to this
strict dichotomy. As indicated by our notion of an anatomical
gradient, some DA neurons transmit mixtures of both salience-
like and value-like signals; still other DA neurons respond to
rewarding but not aversive events (Matsumoto and Hikosaka,
2009b; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010a). These considerations
suggest that some DA neurons may not encode motivational
events along our intuitive axis of ‘‘good’’ versus ‘‘bad’’ and
may instead be specialized to support specific forms of adaptive
behavior.Even in the realm of rewards, there is evidence that DA
neurons transmit different reward signals to different brain
regions (Bassareo and Di Chiara, 1999; Ito et al., 2000; Stefani
and Moghaddam, 2006; Wightman et al., 2007; Aragona et al.,
2009). Diverse responses reported in the SNc and VTA include
neurons that respond only to the start of a trial (Roesch et al.,
2007), perhaps encoding a pure alerting signal; that respond
differently to visual and auditory modalities (Strecker and
Jacobs, 1985), perhaps receiving input from different SC and
PPTg neurons; that respond to the first or last event in a
sequence (Ravel and Richmond, 2006; Jin and Costa, 2010);
that have sustained activation by risky rewards (Fiorillo et al.,
2003); or that are activated during body movements (Schultz,
1986; Kiyatkin, 1988a; Puryear et al., 2010; Jin and Costa,
2010; see also (Phillips et al., 2003b; Stuber et al., 2005). While
each of these response patterns has only been reported in
a minority of studies or neurons, these data suggest that DA
neurons could potentially be divided into a much larger number
of functionally distinct populations.
A final and important consideration is that present recording
studies in behaving animals do not yet provide fully conclusive
measurements of DA neuron activity, because these studies
have only been able to distinguish between DA and non-DA
neurons by using indirect methods, based on neural properties
such as firing rate, spikewaveform, and sensitivity to D2 receptor
agonists (Grace and Bunney, 1983; Schultz, 1986). These
techniques appear to identify DA neurons reliably within the
SNc, indicated by several lines of evidence including comparison
of intracellular and extracellular methods, juxtacellular record-
ings, and the effects of DA-specific lesions (Grace and Bunney,
1983; Grace et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2009). However, recent
studies indicate that this technique may be less reliable in the
VTA, where DA and non-DA neurons have a wider variety of
cellular properties (Margolis et al., 2006, 2008; Lammel et al.,
2008; Brischoux et al., 2009). Even direct measurements of
DA concentrations in downstream structures may not provide
conclusive evidence of DA neuron spiking activity, because DA
concentrations may be controlled by additional factors such as
glutamatergic activation of DA axon terminals (Cheramy et al.,
1991) and rapid changes in the activity of DA transporters (Zahn-
iser andSorkin, 2004). Toperform fully conclusivemeasurements
of DA neuron activity during active behavior it will be necessary to
use new recording techniques, such as combining extracellular
recording with optogenetic stimulation (Jin and Costa, 2010).
Conclusions
An influential concept of midbrain DA neurons has been that they
transmit a uniform motivational signal to all downstream struc-
tures. Here we have reviewed evidence that DA signals are
more diverse than commonly thought. Rather than encoding
a uniform signal, DA neurons come in multiple types that send
distinct motivational messages about rewarding and nonreward-
ing events. Even single DA neurons do not appear to transmit
single motivational signals. Instead, DA neurons transmit
mixtures of multiple signals generated by distinct neural
processes. Some reflect detailed predictions about rewarding
and aversive experiences, while others reflect fast responses
to events of high potential importance.Neuron 68, December 9, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 827
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ReviewIn addition, we have proposed a hypothesis about the nature
of these diverse DA signals, the neural networks that generate
them, and their influence on downstream brain structures and
on motivated behavior. Our proposal can be seen as a synthesis
of previous theories. Many previous theories have attempted to
identify DA neurons with a single motivational process such as
seeking valued goals, engaging motivationally salient situations,
or reacting to alerting changes in the environment. In our view,
DA neurons receive signals related to all three of these
processes. Yet rather than distilling these signals into a uniform
message, we have proposed that DA neurons transmit these
signals to distinct brain structures in order to support distinct
neural systems for motivated cognition and behavior. Some
DA neurons support brain systems that assign motivational
value, promoting actions to seek rewarding events, avoid aver-
sive events, and ensure that alerting events can be predicted
and prepared for in advance. Other DA neurons support brain
systems that are engaged by motivational salience, including
orienting to detect potentially important events, cognitive
processing to choose a response and to remember its conse-
quences, and motivation to persist in pursuit of an optimal
outcome. We hope that this proposal helps lead us to a more
refined understanding of DA functions in the brain, in which DA
neurons tailor their signals to support multiple neural networks
with distinct roles in motivational control.
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